‘Decommission, Rewrite, and Change’ Franco Berardi alias Bifo

Franco Berardi in a demonstration in in the seventies

Franco Berardi is one of the controversial Italian thinkers who are seeking a solution for the gradually collapsing capitalistic system. For him, the best method of fighting today’s abuses comes from an unexpected corner, through love. Only in this manner can the tormented social body recover after years of being driven into the ground.

Merijn Oudenampsen:
How do you look at the present crisis from the perspective on capitalism that you have developed in your work, which revolves around the interconnectedness of economy, language and psychology?
Franco Berardi:

‘Do you remember what happened at the end of the nineties and especially in the spring of the year 2000? After a decade of development, after the belief in the possibility of the infinite expansion of a virtual capitalism based on new technologies, there was a collapse. The bursting of the dot-com bubble. It was a very important moment. And in a sense, what happened in September 2008 in the United States and what is happening now in Europe can be considered as the long after-effects of the crisis of 2000. Because in that crisis, all the elements of novelty, of the new forms of capitalism which I like to call semiocapitalism, became apparent.

The idea of semiocapitalism is based on the interconnection of information technology and the production of economic value. But in this kind of relationship, the human brain and human sensibility is deeply involved as part of the production process, and it also has a fundamental role to play in consumption. The boom of the nineties was based on the exploitation of the human brain, if we look at it from the point of view of immaterial labour and from the attention economy, or rather, the invasion and occupation of our attention by new technologies. Writers like Kevin Kelly, Peter Schwartz, Nicholas Negroponte: all those people were theorizing the possibility of what they called a long boom, an infinite boom. Their theories were deeply flawed, because they were unable to understand that the capacities of the human brain are not infinite. The human brain is limited with regard to physical energy, with regard to affection, with regard to desire, suffering and depression. The days of the long boom, the decade of the nineties, were also the years of Prozac. These were also the years of excitement, produced by the hyper-exploitation of the human mind and the intense use of euphoric drugs.

Now, the crisis of 2000 has been forgotten, because immediately after came the shock of September 11, the beginning of the infinite war launched by the Bush administration. This has been an insane escape from the effects of the crisis. It was an attempt to renew military production, but the war has not been a good pharmaceutic. You can compare it with a person who is in a deep depression, taking amphetamines. It is not the right therapy for depression.
Year after year, the global schizo-economy – a concept I use to bring together economic production and the exploitation of the mind – has been building up to a new, and I think final, collapse. What we see is the coming true of an old prediction, that of the Club of Rome, who in the year of 1972 published a report titled The Limits to Growth. Economic growth cannot be infinite, for a very simple reason. Namely that physical resources are limited, as well as the psychic and mental resources of human kind. The network form has hugely enlarged the possibilities of production, but we are limited as human beings.’
Merijn Oudenampsen:
One could say that whereas before, politics revolved around the promise to increase the size of the pie, characterized by ‘win-win’, presently it is limited to the evermore-bitter struggle over the distribution of what is left of it, a ‘zero-sum-game’. To give you an example, currently in the Netherlands the government has money to bail out the banks, to subsidize home-owners, to build roads, but in order to do that it extracts money from education, from culture, from handicapped people, from healthcare, from social housing and so on. Similar things are happening in Italy now, with the austerity package being implemented by Berlusconi. What is your take on that?
Franco Berardi:

‘I just came back from a demonstration that happened this morning in the city of Bologna. Students were protesting in front of the Banca de Italia, chanting slogans such as ‘more money for the schools, less money for the banks’ and so on. These kinds of protests are spreading all over Europe nowadays. Everybody understands that if you destroy the school system or something simple like the sewage system, let’s say the basic infrastructure of production, it will not help the future economy. But this is the current policy of the European Central Bank, this is the policy for dealing with the financial crisis at the European level. Look at what is happening in Greece, for instance. In Greece, in April 2010, the problem of that country’s huge public debt exploded. The Greek government was obliged to start a policy aimed at extracting resources from the economy in order to pay the German and French banks. Now, one and a half years after that decision, the Greece’s gross national product has fallen by seven percent. The result is that production is going down, and the debt, unavoidably, is skyrocketing up. It makes you wonder: Are those people leading the central bank crazy? Do they understand that what they are doing is totally crippling the basis of what is a healthy economy? Because you cannot withdraw resources from production, from effective demand, from society, and ask for the payment of the debt. That is impossible. I have the suspicion that they are not working on fixing the European economy. They perceive the end of something and they are looking towards a sort of hold-up, a robbery, a huge displacement of wealth from workers, from society, from education, towards the banks and the financial class.

I know that this can seem paranoid, and I do not like to be paranoid. But this is not the effect of a human conspiracy; I do not think it is Angela Merkel, Jean Claude Trichet or Nicolas Sarkozy who are masterminding this dark future. I think it is something that is deeply inscribed in the software of the financial architecture. We have been producing a machine that is only able to think in terms of fighting inflation, enhancing profits, and enforcing competition. The automated system, I mean the software, has been conceived in a form that has now turned destructive in relation to social wealth.
Just to say a word or two on Italy: during the last two years, eight billion Euros have been withdrawn from education. And a hundred thirty thousand teachers have been fired in the Italian schools. What do you think, is this the way to renew growth in Italy? Is it the way to think of the future of Italian society? Obviously not.’
Merijn Oudenampsen:
You just published a new book, After the Future. Could you tell us something about the book?
Franco Berardi:

‘I started writing the book in February of 2009. It was the hundredth anniversary of the publication of the Futurist Manifesto. Futurism is a literary and artistic movement that has been hugely important, both culturally and politically. It can be seen as the first avant-garde movement, which was actively out to overturn society. What defines the Futurist Manifesto, and the Futurist culture in general? It is the exaltation of the virtues of the future. In a sense the futurist movement is an extreme version of the modern veneration of the future as progress, as expansion, and finally, as growth. There is no reason to assume that our idea of the future is something natural. Just think of the theological man of the middle ages: for him, perfection was not in the future. For him perfection was in the past, the time of paradise lost, when God created the world. Then there’s the Renaissance, when the idea comes up of a future produced by man, in a conscious and voluntarist way, politically and economically. In the nineteenth century, the idea of the future as progress becomes part of the human psyche. At the end of the twentieth century, this mythology comes to an end. First of all because of the crisis in the field of energy resources, especially fossil fuels, because of the awareness that growth cannot be infinite.

The beginning of that awareness was already present in the seventies, especially in the year 1977. The year when Sid Vicious and Johnny Rotten of the Sex Pistols went in the streets of London, crying ‘NO FUTURE’. That cry produced deep ripples in the youth culture of the following decades. After the Future is an attempt to rethink the present moment. We live in a time when the expectation of a progressive, expansive future proves illusionary. And it is a dangerous illusion, also because the world is getting old. The human population, not only in Europe but also in China, in India, in Latin America, with the exception of the Arabic world, is ageing. People are living longer and birth rates are going down. The physical energies of the planet are running out. So we have to live with the exhaustion, which can be a very interesting experience if we are able to face it in a non-aggressive and non-competitive way. We don’t need more things. We have too many things in our houses. We need more time, more affection, more solidarity. If we do not understand that, then war will become the only language between humans.
To finish, let me talk about an initiative, a call that I have written together with Geert Lovink. It is directed at the large army of lovers and the small army of software programmers. This is a call to resist, and our main point is that the movement that is coming to the streets in New York and Europe will not win this fight, because this fight cannot be won in the streets. Going to the streets is important, absolutely necessary. It is the way to start the real fight that will come afterwards. And what is the real fight? It is the fight of love. The ability to reactivate the bodies, the social and erotic body, that has been paralyzed by twenty years of precarization, by twenty years of impoverishment. Secondly, the real fight is the fight of software developers, of the people who have been writing the software of the financial system. We call on them in order for them to do what Wikileaks has done in the field of information: decommission, rewrite, and change the course of the future.


Source: http://metropolism.com
Metropolis M

Vandalism Series

John Divola, Vandalism Series: archivally processed black and white photograph 20 x 16 inches, 1973-75.

The Leaves are Falling

Here I am saying “The leaves are falling”
—one of those choruses
that vie with interminable verses
to mock hoarders.
Yeah, we get
that a palette of winds
is a pretty thing:
one blurs the anther, another
the river splurging on riprap,
expunging
phosphates,
out of the temperature
differential building
sculptural fogs
that promenade
between shores a glacier
wedged ajar, a fjord.
Whatever gives the river
its seriousness reverses
in the light
of those clouds moving
as if absorbing
their pomp in advance of it—
characters
which untied the painter
and took the sculls again.

Ange Mlinko
2008

Η Δελφική Ουτοπία

Το «Δελφικό Κέντρο», ήταν ένα όραμα του Σικελιανού για την δημιουργία μιας αυτόνομης κοινότητας στους Δελφούς. Ένα πνευματικό κέντρο το οποίο θα προωθούσε την επαφή των επιστημόνων, των καλλιτεχνών και των πνευματικών ανθρώπων όλων των χωρών. Ένα κέντρο το οποίο θα μπορούσε να κατασκευαστεί μόνο στους Δελφούς, εκεί «στον ιερό χώρο των Αρχαίων Αμφικτιονιών».

Αυτό το όραμα του Σικελιανού, το οποίο ανέλαβε να σχεδιάσει ο Δημήτρης Πικιώνης, δίνοντας του τελικά μια μορφή η οποία παρέπεμπε σε έναν αρχαϊκό ή παραδοσιακό οικισμό, μας μιλάει αφενός για τη σχέση μοντερνισμού και αρχαιότητας και ειδικότερα για το πώς η αρχαιότητα επαναφέρεται συνειδητά στο προσκήνιο την μοντέρνα εποχή. Όπως ανέφερε ο Boissy το 1927 για τις Δελφικές Εορτές:
Το γεγονός τούτο αποτελεί δια την Ελλάδαν μαρτυρία της αναγεννήσεως της ευγενεστέρας αισθητικής.

Έτσι θα μπορούσε το παρελθόν να επανέρθει στην μοντέρνα εποχή ως κάτι το ζωντανό, ως ένα διαχρονικό αισθητικό πρότυπο το οποίο θα εδραίωνε τη συνέχεια ανάμεσα στην παράδοση και την πρωτοπορία. Το «Δελφικό Κέντρο» ως μία πρότυπη κοινότητα του μεσοπολέμου η οποία βαδίζει προς το μέλλον κοιτάζοντας πάντα πίσω της εκφράζει ακριβώς αυτό το όραμα ενός ιδεατού (υπεργήινου) μέλλοντος το οποίο πηγάζει από ένα εξιδανικευμένο μυθικό παρελθόν.

Αυτό το όραμα του Σικελιανού έμεινε όμως στα χαρτιά. Στα πολλά σχετικά κείμενα που έγραψε με πάθος ο ίδιος ο ποιητής, αλλά και στα αρκετά σκίτσα που μας άφησε ο Δημήτρης Πικιώνης, σκίτσα που βρίσκονται πολύ κοντά μας, μέσα σε αυτό εδώ το μουσείο.

Το «Δελφικό Κέντρο», έχει μείνει πλέον στη συνείδησή μας ως μια ουτοπία του ελληνικού μεσοπολεμικού μοντερνισμού. Και ως μια τέτοια ουτοπία θα επιχειρήσω να το δω σήμερα.

ΤΟ ΟΡΑΜΑ

Γνωστοί από τις ανασκαφές της Γαλλικής Σχολής, οι Δελφοί παρουσιάζονται, με τα λόγια του Theophile Homolle, ως ένας τόπος μεγαλείου, μυστηρίου, αποκάλυψης του θείου, παρουσίας των θεών. Κι όλα αυτά σε ενεστώτα χρόνο. Όχι κάτι που ήταν κάποτε, κάτι που υπήρχε στο παρελθόν, αλλά κάτι που είναι, εδώ και τώρα. Η αρχαία πολιτεία μάλιστα αναδύεται μέσα από το έδαφος, αφού πρώτα «καταπιεί» το Καστρί, τον σύγχρονο οικισμό, που δεν φαίνεται να έχει τίποτα το ιερό και το μαγευτικό. Το σημαντικό άρα είναι αυτό που είναι κάτω από το έδαφος, έρχεται από το παρελθόν για να αναβιώσει στο σήμερα.

Κρυμμένοι στην ενδοχώρα, απομονωμένοι από τους γύρω οικισμούς, οι Δελφοί δεσπόζουν πάνω στο βουνό. Με τα λόγια του Σικελιανού:

Ο Παρνασσός πλαισιώνεται πνευματικά απ’ τα Ιμαλάια, και απ’ οποιαδήποτε κορφή του οι μυημένοι αντικρίζουνε ακέριο τον ορίζοντα της Γης.

Όπως τα Ιμαλάια λοιπόν, έτσι και ένα ελληνικό βουνό, ο Παρνασσός υποδέχεται μια πολιτεία ιερή. Αντίστοιχα με τη σύνδεση Παρνασσός-Ιμαλάια γίνεται και η σύνδεση Δελφοί–Δελχί, αναδεικνύοντας έτσι μια πνευματική συγγένεια βασισμένη πάνω σε μια υποτιθέμενη κοινή γλωσσική καταγωγή.

Όπως και να έχει το μεταφυσικό περιεχόμενο είναι αυτό που κυριαρχεί. Ήδη το 1921 ο Σικελιανός γράφει στον Νίκο Καζαντζάκη σχετικά με ένα «κοσμικό μοναστήρι» που σχεδιάζει να οργανώσει, επαναφέροντας την ουτοπία του Campanella στη μοντέρνα εποχή.

Λίγα χρόνια μετά, το 1924, ο Σικελιανός θα εμφανιστεί πάνω στους Δελφούς ντυμένος «με το παχύ ένδυμα αρτίου ψευδοπροφήτου», όπως θα γράψει ο Τάκης Παπατσώνης, για να μιλήσει για το Δελφικό όραμα, για την προσπάθειά του να «μυήσει τον κόσμο σε μία νέα χαώδη θρησκεία».

Ποιά είναι όμως εκείνα τα χαρακτηριστικά που μας κάνουν να μιλάμε για ουτοπία; Σε μια πρώτη προσέγγιση το Δελφικό Κέντρο, όπως κάθε παραδοσιακή ουτοπία έχει μια εμμονή στην οριοθέτηση, την περιχαράκωση, τη διάκριση ανάμεσα στο μέσα και το έξω. Στον Thomas More είναι η μεγάλη τάφρος ανάμεσα στο νησί και την ενδοχώρα. Στο Δελφικό Κέντρο, το τοίχος και η πύλη που σχεδιάζει ο Πικιώνης σε διαφορετικές μορφές, εκφράζουν συμβολικά, άλλοτε εντονότερα και άλλοτε πιο διακριτικά, αυτό το όριο που εξασφαλίζει αυτονομία και αυτάρκεια.

Όπως κάθε σοβαρή ουτοπία, έτσι και το Δελφικό Κέντρο δεν μπορεί παρά να έχει και ένα ορισμένο πολιτικό υπόβαθρο. Ο Σικελιανός θα υιοθετήσει μια ξεκάθαρη ρητορική την οποία συναντάμε εκείνη την εποχή και αλλού στην Ευρώπη. Αντίθετος στον αστισμό και τον καπιταλισμό, / θλιβερά φαινόμενα μιας σημιτικής ιδεολογίας όπως γράφει, θα κηρύξει τους Δελφούς ως κέντρο εναντίον του κάθε είδους υλισμού. Θα ευαγγελιστεί την Αρεία «ηθική και διανοητικότητα» απ’ όπου πηγάζουν αξίες όπως ο αλτρουισμός, η γενναιότητα, η αλληλεγγύη. Θα επιτεθεί στην «αχαμνή σημιτική του Μαρξ θεωρία» και θα προτιμήσει το ηγετικό προφίλ του Λένιν, αλλά και το αναρχικό πνεύμα του Κροπότκιν.

Ωστόσο το Δελφικό Κέντρο δεν θα ακολουθήσει ένα ριζοσπαστικό κοινωνικό μοντέλο, ούτε θα προτείνει ένα νέο, καλύτερο πολιτικό σύστημα. Η αντίδραση στην αστική δημοκρατία και τον υλισμό δεν είναι μια ρήξη προς τα εμπρός, αλλά μία επαναφορά στη σιγουριά του πίσω, στην ολιγαρχία, την αριστοκρατία, ακόμα κι αν μιλάμε για την πνευματική αριστοκρατία των «εκλεκτών». Αυτή η στροφή η οποία υπαγορεύεται από τη νοσταλγία και εμφανίζεται ως πρωτοπορία, είναι κάτι που συναντάμε βέβαια συχνά σε ουτοπίες του μοντερνισμού. Σε αυτήν την περίπτωση το προσδοκώμενο δεν είναι αυτό που δεν έχει έρθει ακόμα, δεν είναι δηλαδή η αναζήτηση άλλων πιθανών εκβάσεων της πολιτικής και της ιστορίας όπως θα ήθελε ο Ernst Bloch, αλλά η αναπόληση αυτού που δεν υπάρχει πια. Όχι το pas encore, αλλά το αντίθετό του, το non plus.

Στον τομέα της οικονομίας και της παραγωγής το Δελφικό Κέντρο είναι εκείνη η περίπτωση όπου η μοντέρνα ουτοπία νοσταλγεί την προβιομηχανική κοινωνία. Βαδίζοντας πάνω σε μια λογική τύπου Morris ο Σικελιανός τονίζει την αξία της κοινοβιακής μη αλλοτριωμένης εργασίας και παρουσιάζει τα δικά του «νέα από το πουθενά». Θέτει ως προϋπόθεση της κατασκευής του ίδιου του Κέντρου την εθελοντική δουλειά των τοπικών μαστόρων, αλλά και «των αστέγων της Δελφικής περιοχής και των άλλων Ελλήνων, προσφύγων και μη». Έτσι «τα έξοδα για την ανέγερση αυτή των κτηρίων του συνοικισμού, της κοινότητας και του Δελφικού Κέντρου θα περιορίζονταν στο ελάχιστο, χάρη στην εθελοντική προσωπική εργασία χιλιάδων Ελλήνων».

Η Δελφική κοινότητα στο μυαλό του Σικελιανού θα μπορούσε επίσης να είναι αυτόνομη, να ζει από την εκμετάλλευση της δικής της γεωργικής και βιοτεχνικής παραγωγής. Σε αυτό το πλαίσιο είναι που εντάσσεται και η τέχνη. Η τέχνη όχι ως έργα για το μουσείο, αλλά ως διακοσμημένα αντικείμενα μιας χρηστικής λειτουργίας. Η τέχνη ως καθημερινή πρακτική, σε ένα αυτοτελές σύνολο, έναν αυτόνομο και αυτάρκη οικισμό, έναν κόσμο σταθερό και πλήρη. Τόσο πλήρη ώστε και η ίδια η τέχνη να μοιάζει περιττή.

Η ΠΡΑΓΜΑΤΙΚΟΤΗΤΑ

Όπως κι αν είχαν τα πράγματα όμως στο όραμα του Σικελιανού ή στα σχέδια του Πικιώνη, η πορεία από τη φαντασία στην πραγματικότητα δεν ήταν εύκολη. Από νωρίς είχε γίνει σε όλους σαφές ότι αυτή η κοινότητα, όσο τέλεια και αν λειτουργούσε, δεν θα μπορούσε να σταθεί στα δικά της πόδια χωρίς εξωτερική βοήθεια. Γι αυτό και ο Σικελιανός εναπόθετε τις περισσότερες ελπίδες του στον τουρισμό. Ο Σικελιανός εμφανίζονταν σίγουρος ότι οι Δελφοί μπορούν να γίνουν ένας προορισμός ιδιαίτερα σημαντικός. Πόσο σημαντικός; Στο μυαλό του Σικελιανού οι Δελφοί, έχοντας μια παγκόσμια εμβέλεια θα μπορέσουν άνετα να ξεπεράσουν σε επισκεψιμότητα το ταπεινό Salzburg. Οι ακτοπλοϊκές γραμμές θα συνέδεαν την Ιτέα με την κεντρική και βόρεια Ευρώπη και από τα δεκάδες υπερωκεάνια θα έφταναν εκατομμύρια τουρίστες. Το μέγεθος των Δελφών δεν μπορούσε να θεωρείται μειονέκτημα. Όπως σε κάθε ουτοπία, η μικρή κοινότητα είχε σημασία αντιστρόφως ανάλογη του μεγέθους της και εμβέλεια που ξεπερνούσε κατά πολύ τα γεωγραφικά της όρια.

Η προσδοκία των εσόδων που θα έφερνε ο τουρισμός ήταν και αυτή που ενθουσίαζε τον τύπο της εποχής. Θα δούνε οι ξένοι, γράφανε οι εφημερίδες, ότι δεν υπάρχουν μόνο οι Δελφοί και τα αρχαία αλλά και η Αράχοβα με το τσαρούχι, τη φλογέρα και το δημοτικό της τραγούδι. Κάπως έτσι είδε το θέμα και η πολιτεία που άρχισε να σκέφτεται ζεστά το ενδεχόμενο κατασκευής ενός μεγάλου ξενοδοχείου, ένα ενδεχόμενο που έμοιαζε να προχωράει κάποια στιγμή. Ο υπουργός συμφώνησε, ο οργανισμός τουρισμού το ενέκρινε, το οικόπεδο βρέθηκε και απαλλοτριώθηκε. Τότε όμως εμφανίστηκε ένα πρακτικό πρόβλημα. Το νερό της Κασταλίας πηγής δεν έφτανε για να καλύψει μεγάλες ξενοδοχειακές εγκαταστάσεις και η σκέψη για μεταφορά νερού απαιτούσε τεχνικά και οικονομικά μέσα τα οποία η πολιτεία δεν ήταν διατεθειμένη να δώσει. Ο τύπος δεν έκρυβε τις ανησυχίες του: λόγω της έλλειψης νερού, η Δελφική Ιδέα κινδύνευε να γίνει Ουτοπία.

Οι ανησυχίες επαληθεύτηκαν όταν η έλλειψη ενός τέτοιου ξενοδοχείου υποδοχής εμφανίστηκε με δραματικό τρόπο στις δεύτερες Δελφικές Εορτές. Τότε ήταν που κατά τη διάρκεια των παραστάσεων, μια βροχή έφτασε για να προκαλέσει το χάος και να κάνει το όνειρο εφιάλτη. Οι δρόμοι έκλεισαν, ο χώρος γέμισε λάσπη, τα πρόχειρα καταλύματα έμπαζαν από παντού. Καλοντυμένοι κύριοι έβριζαν και κυρίες με σπασμένα τακούνια μετάνιωναν για τον ερχομό τους στους Δελφούς. Όπως έγραψαν και οι εφημερίδες οι επισκέπτες:

Μεταννούσαν δια των ερχομό των εις τους Δελφούς ως εάν να είχαν κάμη την μεγαλειτέραν τρέλλαν της ζωής τους!

Ο Βενιζέλος πάλι ασχολούνταν με πιο επείγοντα προβλήματα. Ο αντιακριδικός αγώνας του φαινόταν σημαντικότερος. Προκειμένου να εξοντωθούν οι ακρίδες προτιμότερο θα ήταν να σταματήσουν οι Δελφικές Εορτές. Η επίσημη πολιτεία έμοιαζε να έχει άλλες προτεραιότητες. Το Δελφικό Κέντρο φλέρταρε πλέον επικίνδυνα με την Ουτοπία.

Όσο η Ελλάδα φαινόταν απρόθυμη και δυσκίνητη στην πορεία υλοποίησης του Δελφικού Κέντρου, τόσο ο Σικελιανός προσπαθούσε να κάνει το όραμά του μια διεθνή υπόθεση. Το 1928, σε μία ελληνογαλλική συνάντηση στο Παρίσι, ο Σικελιανός προτείνει, μια συμβολική κίνηση. Τη μεταφορά του ιερού πυρός από τον τάφο του άγνωστου στρατιώτη στο Παρίσι, στον ναό του Απόλλωνα στους Δελφούς. Οι συνδαιτυμόνες, ανάμεσα στους οποίους προσωπικότητες όπως ο Gabriel Boissy, ο Mario Mennier κ.α. ενθουσιάζονται στην ιδέα. Αυτοί που αντιδρούν όμως είναι ιταλοί δημοσιογράφοι οι οποίοι την θεώρησαν μια «γαλλική πνευματική προπαγάνδα», ένα ελληνογαλλικό μέτωπο ενάντια στην πρόσφατη ελληνοϊταλική συμμαχία.

Πιθανά εκείνη την περίοδο που βρίσκεται στο Παρίσι, το 1928, ο Σικελιανός είναι που έχει και την ιδέα για μια διεθνή έκθεση μοντέρνας τέχνης στους Δελφούς με έργα των Picasso, Braque, Derain, Léger κ.α. καθώς και η πρόσκληση στον Le Corbusier να έρθει να την διοργανώσει. Παράλληλα ο Σικελιανός συνεχίζει τις επαφές του με τους Γάλλους διανοούμενους ελπίζοντας σε ένα ακόμα οργανωμένο ταξίδι στους Δελφούς, χωρίς όμως να έχει το επιθυμητό αποτέλεσμα. Από την άλλη, ούτε η Εύα Πάλμερ καταφέρνει να βρει οικονομική υποστήριξη για το Δελφικό Κέντρο στην Αμερική. Αν και απευθύνεται σε πολλούς – από παλιούς γνωστούς μέχρι και το ίδρυμα Rockefeller - όλοι ακούν με ενδιαφέρον το σχέδιο για το Δελφικό Κέντρο κανένας όμως δεν έχει τη διάθεση να το ενισχύσει οικονομικά. Η Ουτοπία έρχεται ένα βήμα πιο κοντά.

Η ΟΥΤΟΠΙΑ ΠΟΥ ΕΓΙΝΕ ΙΣΤΟΡΙΑ

Στην εποχή του Μεσοπολέμου, το Δελφικό Κέντρο αποτέλεσε μία μοναδική περίπτωση για την Ελλάδα, ένα φιλόδοξο όραμα χωρίς προηγούμενο. Η Δελφική Ουτοπία εμφανίστηκε ως μία πρόταση για ένα νέο, μοντέρνο, πνευματικό κέντρο το οποίο θα αναβίωνε τις αισθητικές αρχές και αξίες του παρελθόντος.

Η Ελλάδα του 1920 και του 1930 όμως, δεν έβλεπε την αναβίωση της αρχαιότητας με την ιδιαίτερη ματιά του Σικελιανού ή του Πικιώνη, αλλά μόνο ως ευκαιρία οικονομικής ανάπτυξης μιας μικρής αποδυναμωμένης περιοχής μέσω του τουρισμού. Οι περισσότεροι πολιτικοί μπορεί να έμοιαζαν ενθουσιασμένοι με το Δελφικό όραμα, αλλά πίσω από αυτό έβλεπαν μάλλον τα χρήματα που θα εισέρχονταν στα ταμεία ή τους ψήφους από την τοπική κοινωνία. Μια κοινωνία η οποία σαν όραμα για το δικό της μέλλον πιθανά δεν είχε τις εικόνες με τις χλαμύδες και τα δόρατα των δελφικών εορτών, αλλά τις διαφημίσεις από τις ηλεκτρικές κουζίνες και τα ψυγεία που έβρισκε λίγο πιο δίπλα, στις ίδιες σελίδες των εφημερίδων της εποχής.

Εκεί ακριβώς είναι που εισάγεται στην όλη ιστορία μία αντίφαση. Ποιά; Μα ακριβώς το γεγονός ότι για να λειτουργήσει ο «αρχαϊκός κόσμος» του Δελφικού Κέντρου θα έπρεπε να υποστηριχθεί από πλήθος μοντέρνα έργα, δίκτυα και κατασκευές. Δρόμους, αυτοκίνητα, καράβια, λιμάνια, επικοινωνίες. Αυτό που θα επέτρεπε στο παρελθόν να αναβιώσει θα ήταν με άλλα λόγια η μοντέρνα εποχή. Για να υλοποιηθεί η Δελφική Ουτοπία και να γίνει πραγματικότητα, το Δελφικό Κέντρο θα έπρεπε να πάψει να είναι ουτοπία και να γίνει ιστορία.

Αν όμως υπάρχει κάτι που δεν μπορεί να γίνει η ουτοπία αυτό είναι ιστορία. Τουλάχιστον η μοντέρνα ουτοπία η οποία εμφανίζεται ως κατεξοχήν αντι-ιστορική, ως ένας κόσμος ο οποίος είναι έξω από την ιστορία. Έτσι και το Δελφικό Κέντρο, ως μοντέρνα ουτοπία, αναφέρεται σε μια ονειρική συνθήκη, σε μία ιδανική εποχή όπου στην πολιτική δεν υπάρχει η σύγκρουση και στην κοινωνία δεν υπάρχει ο μόχθος. Σε μια εποχή δηλαδή όπου, θα έχει πλέον επέλθει το τέλος της ιστορίας.

Στην αρχετυπική ουτοπία του More, ο Ούτοπος ιδρύει και φτιάχνει μια πολιτεία εκ του μηδενός, χωρίς καμιά αναφορά σε καταγωγή, προγόνους και παρελθόν. Στην περίπτωση του Δελφικού Κέντρου έχουμε το ακριβώς αντίθετο. Μια ουτοπία η οποία φτιάχνεται ακριβώς πάνω σε αυτό που ήδη υπάρχει ή μάλλον από αυτό που ήδη υπάρχει, από αποσπάσματα και μέρη του πραγματικού και συμβολικού του σώματος. Μήπως λοιπόν, θα έπρεπε να είμαστε πιο προσεκτικοί όταν χαρακτηρίζουμε το Δελφικό Κέντρο ως Ουτοπία; Ίσως. Η αλήθεια είναι ότι αυτήν τη λέξη ο Σικελιανός και ο Πικιώνης δεν την χρησιμοποίησαν ποτέ.

Κωστας Τσιαμπαος

Εισηγηση απο το συνεδριο "Παρίσι - Αθήνα 1919-1939. Το διπλό ταξίδι" με θέμα τις καλλιτεχνικές και πνευματικές σχέσεις Ελλάδας-Γαλλίας μεταξύ 1919-1939. Μουσειο Μπενακη, 20 Ιανουαρίου.
Source:kostastsiambaos.blogspot.com/

DIY bookshelf

Piazza della Repubblica, Roma, 2012

Postcard from Athens

Protests in Athens, December 2011

‘Athens is the new Berlin.’ This hopeful phrase, constantly repeated by visitors to the 3rd Athens Biennale, and by the artists who have moved to Athens to take advantage of the cheap rents and cultural climate, may or may not be true. There are many contenders for the title – Buenos Aires, even Warsaw – but what is indisputable is that Athens is the leader in EU econ-disaster tourism.
A recent trip to Athens revealed: empty office buildings replete with derelict storefronts, even edging upon city’s main square; manned police barricades separating the haute-bourgeois Kolonaki district from the anarchist Exarchia quarter next door; junkies everywhere, clusters of them nodding outside the National Archeological Museum, almost outnumbering the sprinkling of tourists heading in; a charming nativity scene on in a central square, one of the few on display, only left unmolested because of 24/7 police protection. These scenes are merely the visible manifestations of the country’s alarming underlying economic statistics. Youth unemployment is currently approaching 50%, while Greece’s health has also been affected by the economic crisis. According to The Lancet, ‘Suicides rose by 17% in 2009 from 2007 and unofficial 2010 data quoted in parliament mention a 25% rise compared with 2009.’ Also in The Lancet, ‘an authoritative report described accounts of deliberate self-infection (HIV) by a few individuals to obtain access to benefits of €700 per month and faster admission onto drug substitution programmes.’
But these statistics distract from the fact that, until recently at least, Greece was a middle-class and middle-income country. This isn’t yet ancient history – much remains. When I was there in December, I saw trendy new cupcake chains situated next to Starbucks in the rich coastal suburbs; elsewhere, fashionable couples are moving to the fraying Omonia Square (where the nativity scene was guarded by the police), to live amidst the desolation. And for those who still have jobs, Greeks work very hard: the average work-week is 42 hours, compared to just under 36 hours for Germans. But the economy is continuing its downward spiral, and the end of the decline is not in sight, not even after potential default. The big money, as everyone believes, is parked in London, waiting for the inevitable fire sale of assets that is surely coming.



Matias Faldbakken, Untitled (Young is better than old) (2008), installation view of ‘MONODROME’, the 3rd Athens Biennial

Greece, though cut off economically, politically and even geographically, is not isolated culturally. In this respect it is still part of Western Europe and there are many continuing conversations. A tantalizing fragment of a conversation overheard in a taverna: ‘The tragedy of Vyner Street is…’ In the same taverna I spoke to a Greek museologist who said, ‘I just wish I could live in a more typical country, without out social problems.’ I asked her to elaborate on these problems – did she mean the junkies? ‘No, I mean our personal relationships. There is a hardening, of everyone out for themselves, and an inability to admit they are in trouble.’ She told me the final stages of this cycle is a drawing in and a personal isolation caused by having no money. And though a lack of money is sometimes associated with artistic and musical dynamism, as with the ’80s downtown scene in New York, this is not obviously true for Athens club culture. A musician told me that, ‘Before the crisis, I would was more careful about what gigs I would take, now I will do any job for the money. This is true for everyone I know.’
Greek cinema is the art form that is currently attracting the most international attention. Dogtooth, the 2009 film about a strange and isolated family living on a country estate, was nominated for an Oscar last year. This year’s Academy Awards entry from Greece is Attenberg (2010), about a girl who interprets life through watching David Attenborough (which she pronounces Attenberg) wildlife documentaries; the soundtrack includes New York no-wave band Suicide. Both films are oblique commentaries on the crisis, turning a knowing and sceptical eye on the Greek family unit, but also out on the wider world. But to me the most memorable feature of Dogtooth is the dance scene, an eerie, melancholy and ironic reinterpretation of Flashdance. And the Greek surprising genius in dance was very much on display at the closing night party of the Athens Biennale, as seen in the moves of biennial co-curators X&Y and team.
A visit to Athens, a city dominated by the Parthenon on the Acropolis above but in a country now ruled by an unelected, technocratic government, with default looming, may seem like to a trip to the past: to the Great Depression; fin de siècle Vienna; the ancients under the tyrants; Weimar Berlin. But of course, it is none of these: it is a visit to our future.

Text by David Adler
Source : blog.frieze.com/

Flower and Frog

Frederick Sommer
Flower and Frog, 1947/48
Vintage silver print

To the Boy Elis

Elis, when the blackbird calls in the black woods,
This is your decline.
Your lips drink the coolness of the blue rock-spring.

Cease, when your forehead bleeds quietly
Ancient legends
And dark interpretations of the flight of birds.

But with gentle steps you walk into the night,
That hangs full of purple grapes,
And you move the arms more beautifully in the blueness.

A thorn bush tinges,
Where your moon-like eyes are.
O, how long, Elis, have you been dead.

Your body is a hyacinth,
Into which a monk dips his waxy fingers.
Our silence is a black cavern,

From which a soft animal steps at times
And slowly lowers heavy eyelids.
On your temples black dew drips,

The last gold of expired stars.



Elis, wenn die Amsel im schwarzen Wald ruft,
Dieses ist dein Untergang.
Deine Lippen trinken die Kühle des blauen Felsenquells.

Laß, wenn deine Stirne leise blutet
Uralte Legenden
Und dunkle Deutung des Vogelflugs.

Du aber gehst mit weichen Schritten in die Nacht,
Die voll purpurner Trauben hängt
Und du regst die Arme schöner im Blau.

Ein Dornenbusch tönt,
Wo deine mondenen Augen sind.
O, wie lange bist, Elis, du verstorben.


Dein Leib ist eine Hyazinthe,
In die ein Mönch die wächsernen Finger taucht.
Eine schwarze Höhle ist unser Schweigen,


Daraus bisweilen ein sanftes Tier tritt
Und langsam die schweren Lider senkt.
Auf deine Schläfen tropft schwarzer Tau,


Das letzte Gold verfallener Sterne.

Georg Trakl, 1913

Ludwig XVI. mit Jakobinermütze

Noel Lemire, „Ludwig XVI. mit Jakobinermütze", 1792
LWL - Landesmuseum für Kunst und Kulturgeschichte Münster / Sabine Ahlbrand-Dornseif

Advertising mast and press box

These pictures were taken at Arkitekturmuseet in Stockholm one month before. The Stockholm exhibition in the summer of 1930 manifested a new view on design and architecture known as functionalism. Pure forms, smooth surfaces, bright colors and almost flat roofs were the language of architecture as evidenced by the advertising mast on the exhibition campus. As we can see from the model, the décor could be replaced by advertising message in stringent graphic form.

Architect: Gunnar Asplund, Stockholm 1930
Scale 1 : 100

Philosophy of Cosmology

In a new partnership between Oxford and Cambridge, researchers in physics and philosophy Simon Saunders, Joe Silk, and David Wallace at Oxford University, and John Barrow and Jeremy Butterfield at Cambridge, are to join researchers at a cluster of US universities including Columbia University, Yale University, and New York University, to establish the field of philosophy of cosmology as a new branch of philosophy of physics.


A corner of the WMAP scan of the cosmological microwave background.
But is what we see typical of the universe as a whole?
(Photograph courtesy of Max Tegmark, MIT.)

The initiative, funded by the John Templeton Foundation, is of three years in duration and will culminate in a major international conference. The enduring impact of the project will be to isolate and clarify the outstanding conceptual problems in the foundations of cosmology, to seed and stimulate future research in the subject, and to define philosophy of cosmology as a new field in its own right, with its own distinctive problems and motivations.

Chief among them, according to Simon Saunders of Oxford University, ‘is the problem of how to compensate for selection effects – of making sense of the so-called ‘anthropic principle’. Even if we knew the structure of the universe, the whole story from beginning to end, what should we expect to see from our particular corner of it? What are the probabilities? And of course that’s what’s relevant to experiments.’ The problem isn’t restricted to the distribution of stars or galaxies; it could extend to the values of supposedly fundamental constants, such as the cosmological constant --- or dark energy, as it is known.

"Explaining the value of the cosmological constant is one of the most critical problems in theoretical physics" says John Barrow, whose book The Anthropic Cosmological Principle, co-written with Frank Tipler, set the agenda for anthropic reasoning in cosmology the last two decades. “This problem goes deeper than merely describing the accelerated expansion of the universe: it requires an understanding of the vacuum, how the quantum nature of reality impacts on the universe as a whole, and what probability means when used to evaluate observed properties of the universe.”

The initiative is being made now in part because cosmology has in recent years turned into a spectacularly successful empirical discipline. But there is another reason too. “One of the key obstacles to progress in understanding the universe as a whole – particularly the early universe -- is the lack of a realist understanding of quantum theory”, says Saunders. “There are different aspects to the realism problem. One of them is about the nature of reality at the microscopic level; another is about how to apply quantum theory to systems ‘from the inside’ – to so-called closed systems. The latter is called the measurement problem. The universe as a whole is closed in this sense.” How then is it possible to apply quantum theory to cosmology – to obtain a genuinely quantum cosmology? “There has been real progress on that front in the last twenty years” Saunders continues. “That’s where our group and the East Coast group has an edge. We are interested in exploring these questions in quantum theories that are free of the measurement problem. Physicists try to be neutral on these questions, but it’s hard to do that and make sense of quantum cosmology”.

A major component of the Oxford-Cambridge project, like that of the US cluster led by Barry Loewer at Rutgers University, is to establish a community of scholars able to engage with such foundational questions in cosmology. To that end Joe Silk at Oxford, and John Barrow at Cambridge, will host a series of lecture courses, to be given by eminent figures in cosmology. These will be filmed and archived on a website dedicated to providing research materials and teaching resources in cosmology. Another component is related to the ‘PLUS’ e-magazine, associated with the Millennium Mathematics Project at Cambridge University, which will house a series of interviews with leaders in cosmology on key questions in foundations. The three-year project will culminate in a major international conference, and the publication of a volume of papers devoted to the philosophy of cosmology.

The US cluster includes Columbia University, Yale University, New York University, and the University of California at Santa Cruz. It encompasses nine scholars: Barry Loewer, Dean Zimmerman, Sheldon Goldstein and Roderich Tumulka of Rutgers; Albert and Brian Greene of Columbia, Tim Maudlin of New York University, Priya Natarajan of Yale, and Joel Primack of the University of California, Santa Cruz. Loewer, Zimmerman, Albert and Maudlin are philosophers; Goldstein and Tumulka, mathematicians; Greene, Natarajan, and Primack, physicists. The US cluster, like the Oxford-Cambridge partnership, is funded by a $960,000 grant from the John Templeton Foundation.

Source: www.philosophy.ox.ac.uk

Round and round, hanging infinity

Magnus Thierfelder, Round and round, hanging infinity, 2011
Elastic Gallery, Malmo, 25/11 - 28/1 2012
Source : www.magnusthierfelder.com

Topology

Eyal Weizman, “Intertwined Sovereignty,” 2005

Giorgio Agamben, Eric Alliez, Étienne Balibar, Drucilla Cornell, Olafur Eliasson, Oscar Guardiola Rivera, David Harvey, Bruno Latour, Catherine Malabou, Achille Mbembe, Sandro Mezzadra, Ernesto Neto, Luiz Alberto Oliveira, Suely Rolnik, Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Anton Schütz, Peter Sloterdijk, Nigel Thrift, Shiv Visvanathan, Peter Weibel, Margaret Wertheim and Thanos Zartaloudis are among the leading intellectuals, artists and writers who will be coming to Tate Modern as part of the Topology project.

Mathematicians in the first half of the twentieth century constructed Topology as a general theory of space. It initially emerged as an understanding of space in terms of properties of connectedness and invariance under transformation. Within a few years of its inception, psychologists, psychoanalysts, architects, artists, scientists and philosophers had started to use the conceptual language of relationships, intensities and transformations of this new theory outside its original field of mathematics. Limit, boundary, interior, exterior, neighbourhood, disconnection and cut were central notions that became ways of describing the fields of forces experienced by individuals. Static ideas of space as a container were replaced by understandings of movement-space, of multiplicity, differentiation and exclusive inclusion that in turn have led to new ideas of power, subjectivity, and creativity.

Topological theory has thus come to serve as a link in a network of disciplines: in each case the multiplicity of space and the formal analysis of its relations has proved illuminating. Few commentators have made explicit the nature of this topological grounding however, and in many ways these mathematical realities have been allowed to fade into the background. The Topology series of events renders explicit what has been lost sight of in this process by inviting contemporary intellectuals, artists and writers to discuss how they make use of topology in their thinking, writing and making.

Topology: Spaces of Transformation, conceived by Jean Matthee, is a major series of keynote conversations with leading intellectuals, artists and writers on the stakes and implications of topology on thinking, writing, making and acting in the world. How are the new topological spaces of globalisation open to intervention and creativity?

Topology: Embodying Transformation is a performance programme that explores auditory geometry by spatialising sound and sonifying space and where dancers perform abstract mathematical ideas. Devised by Julian Henriques, Goldsmiths, University of London, and Brian Rotman, Ohio State University as part of the Topology events at Tate Modern.

Topology: Secrets of Space is a series of seminars led by Bernard Burgoyne that investigates the construction of spatial attributes appealed to by the cultural and political theories discussed in the Starr Auditorium during the Topology series.

Curated by Jean Matthee with Bernard Burgoyne, Marko Daniel, Julian Henriques, Celia Lury and Brian Rotman.

Tate Modern
5 November 2011–16 June 2012

I Burattini

British Puppet theatre (Punch and Judy style), c. 1770
Engraving, 38,5 x 29,5 cm. Francesco Maggiotto inv., Giovanni Volpato sculp. apud Nic. Cavalli Venetiis.

Man and His Organism

i
Man is but a perambulating tool-box and workshop, or office, fashioned for itself by a piece of very clever slime, as the result of long experience; and truth is but its own most enlarged, general and enduring sense of the coming togetherness or convenience of the various conventional arrangements which, for some reason or other, it has been led to sanction. Hence we speak of man’s body as his “trunk.”
ii
The body is but a pair of pincers set over a bellows and a stewpan and the whole fixed upon stilts.
iii
A man should see himself as a kind of tool-box; this is simple enough; the difficulty is that it is the tools themselves that make and work the tools. The skill which now guides our organs and us in arts and inventions was at one time exercised upon the invention of these very organs themselves. Tentative bankruptcy acts afford good illustrations of the manner in which organisms have been developed. The ligaments which bind the tendons of our feet or the valves of our blood vessels are the ingenious enterprises of individual cells who saw a want, felt that they could supply it, and have thus won themselves a position among the old aristocracy of the body politic.
The most incorporate tool - as an eye or a tooth or the fist, when a blow is struck with it - has still something of the non-ego about it; and in like manner such a tool as a locomotive engine, apparently entirely separated from the body, must still from time to time, as it were, kiss the soil of the human body and be handled, and thus become incorporate with man, if it is to remain in working order.

Samuel Butler, The Note-Books,1912

Proposal for a Monument ready to Collapse

Proposal for a Monument ready to Collapse (Welfare State) , 2011
Wood, plywood, acrylic
30 cm x 24 x 20 cm

White melancholia, Mourning the loss of "Good old Sweden"

Sweden's post-war image as frontrunner of egalitarianism and antiracism contains more than a trace of national and racial chauvinism, argue two whiteness studies scholars. As myths of the better Sweden fade, both Right and Left are consumed by "white melancholy".

Sweden's 2010 election brought the racist Sweden Democrats into the national parliament for this first time. Post-election discussions and analyses have tended to explain the presence of a racist party in the Swedish parliament as a reflection of dissatisfaction among certain voter segments, without taking into account any analysis of issues of race and whiteness. At the same time, there has been an eruption of official antiracism among the elites and within the Swedish establishment.

However, a critical analysis of post-election Sweden in terms of race and whiteness has not been heard. Why not? How are we to understand the fact that whiteness and white privileges are maintained in a country ruled by progressive social policies, democratisation projects, gender equality and official antiracism?

We argue that Sweden is currently undergoing a double crisis of Swedish whiteness. "old Sweden", i.e. Sweden as a homogeneous society, and "good Sweden", i.e. Sweden as a progressive society, are both perceived to be threatened by the presence of non-white migrants and their descendants. Both the reactionary and racist camp and the progressive and antiracist camp are mourning the loss of this double-edged Swedish whiteness.

We also argue that our analysis of Swedish whiteness is also applicable to the situations in neighbouring Scandinavian countries, particularly to Norway after the Utøya massacre, which has prompted similar reactions to those in Sweden after the 2010 election.

The foundations of Swedish whiteness
In contemporary Sweden, the idea of being white constitutes the central core and master signifier of Swedishness, and thus of being Swedish. A Swede is a white person and a non-white person is not a Swede. In other words, within the Swedish national imaginary the difference between the genetic concept of race and the cultural concept of ethnicity has collapsed completely: whiteness is Swedishness and Swedishness is whiteness.

The conflation of race and ethnicity and the equivalence of Swedishness with whiteness is not only encountered by non-white migrants and their descendants, but also by adopted and mixed Swedes of colour with South American, African or Asian backgrounds. In spite of being more or less fully embedded within Swedishness on an ethnic, linguistic, religious and cultural level, these people experience racializing practices as a result of their "non-Swedish" bodies.[1]

The historical construction of Swedishness can be traced to the pre-eminence of the Swedes, along with the Norwegians and Danes, in the construction of the white race as the elite of homo sapiens. In a scientific discourse hegemonic for almost 200 years, the Swedes and other Scandinavians were considered the most physically and aesthetically perfect people on earth.[2]

The nation's scholars excelled in and contributed substantially to racial science: Carl Linnaeus created the first modern scientific system for race classification in the mid-1700s; Anders Retzius invented the skull or cephalic index – which became the principal method for racial science itself – in the 1850s; and the Swedish government founded the Swedish Institute for Racial Biology in 1922.[3] In the mid 1930s, Sweden also installed one of the most effective sterilization programs ever, a eugenicist project that was both racialized, heteronormative, gendered and classed, and that affected more than 60 000 Swedes before being dissolved in the mid-1970s.[4]

However from the 1960s and 1970s, Sweden and the other Scandinavian countries arguably became the leading (western) voice and (white) supporter of decolonisation and anti-colonial, anti-segregation and anti-apartheid movements. In the process, the world's most radical proponent of social justice and gender equality transformed racism into a non-Swedish issue.

In a feat of national branding, "good Sweden" was promoted as more tolerant and liberal than any other (western) country and (white) people in the world. One result was, for example, that Swedes have adopted proportionally the most children of colour from former colonies than any other western country; or that Swedes have entered into interracial marriages and relationships more frequently than other western nations. Sweden imagined itself as a non-racist and post-racial utopia with no colonial past.

Swedish concepts of whiteness have developed since Sweden became a country of immigration. In everyday life, in the public sphere and in political discourse, people belonging to the 8 per cent of the total population with origins in a non-European, postcolonial or "Third World" country in Asia, Africa or South America are categorized as "immigrants", "foreigners" and "non-Swedes", and often as non-Christian or at least non-Lutheran.

Immigrants from non-western countries began to arrive in Sweden and Scandinavia in small numbers in the 1950s, and then in larger numbers in the second half of the 1970s and particularly the 1980s and onwards, when refugee immigration took over from labour immigration. Not coincidentally, this is also when integration started to be described as a "failed" project. Since the 1990s, non-white and non-Christian immigrants have dominated immigration to Sweden.

When it comes to the discrimination of migrants and their descendants, particularly non-white and non-European groups, Sweden barely differs from any other western country today. Particularly when it comes to housing, Sweden stands out for its highly racialized patterns of residential segregation.

Against this historical background, notions of Swedish whiteness evolved alongside the image of Sweden developed during the Cold War, decolonization and the social revolution of 1968: that of Sweden as paradise on earth and utopia for human rights, democracy, gender equality and antiracism, where race as concept and as category has been rendered irrelevant and obsolete.
The expanding boundaries of whiteness
Whiteness is a pivotal concept for analysing the recent Swedish election. Swedish whiteness includes racists as well as antiracists, and ultimately all Swedes, regardless of political views. Swedish whiteness is similar to the hegemonic whiteness that Matthew Hughey analyses in his interviews with white antiracists and white racists in the US, which reveal, beyond ideological statements, many similarities in terms of white perspectives and privileges.[5]

When it comes to the construction and maintenance of Swedish whiteness, complicity exists on all sides, even that of migrants who believe in the image of Sweden as the most egalitarian and antiracist country in the world. Then there are the numerous non-Swedes who desire and seek (white) Swedes as partners and friends, purely because they are (white) Swedes and therefore the most beautiful and genetically valuable people on earth – according to the Nordic racial myth.

Third World solidarity and antiracism has, in other words, gone hand in hand with white superiority and white homogeneity. It is this dual image of Sweden as an homogenous and white society that the Sweden Democrats mourn the loss of, and their response is to produce hatred towards migrants of colour. Meanwhile, it is the passing of the image of Sweden as an egalitarian and progressive society so dear to white antiracists that has provoked such a strong reaction among the Swedish elites after the election.

Central to this analysis is an understanding of whiteness as a category that constantly expands.[6] The boundaries of whiteness have always been reconstructed to include new members: for example Irish-Americans and Italian-Americans in the US. In the recent Swedish election, the expansion of the boundaries of whiteness blurred class differences, enabling the inclusion of white people from a range of class and cultural backgrounds to congregate around the notion of Swedish whiteness regardless of national origin. David Roediger has called this process "the wages of whiteness", referring to "compensation" of white US workers for their economic subordination with the public and psychological wage of being considered white and therefore "American".[7]

This means that race and racism are not merely the effect of class inequality, something that would necessarily disappear in a classless society. The expansion of the boundaries of whiteness helps explain the class-crossing practices found among the Sweden Democrats' voters, as well as among far-right voters in the other Scandinavian countries. Many Sweden Democrats are migrants or descendants of migrants from white, western, Christian countries, or of non-white mixed and adopted Swedes, who also may identify with being Swedish in order to be able to gain "the wages of whiteness".
Gender equality and whiteness
A central aspect of the construction of "good Sweden" has to do with the generous welfare state and achievements in gender equality. Along with other Scandinavian countries, Sweden has been regarded as exceptionally "woman-friendly" and ranked among the most gender-equal societies in the world. This ideal has been exported to other (Third World) countries through international development aid. However, the institutionalised gender equality discourse carries with it a sense of national identity that is intimately intertwined with whiteness and racial hierarchies, and that excludes migrants as Others.[8]

In order to maintain the supposedly uniquely Swedish construct of gender equality, non-whites are depicted as the "gender non-equal", in conjunction with a discourse of the "oppression of the Other". For Swedish white gender equality to exist, some-body is needed that is not Swedish, gender-equal and white.[9] This might explain why two of Scandinavia's far-rightwing leaders are women, and why the Norwegian far-right terrorist Anders Behring Breivik was obsessed by gender and sexual issues.

Gender equality, in its ideal form, is represented by the white heterosexual family. In Patricia Hill Collins' analysis, the white family model is a site where notions of first- and second-class citizenship, territory, "home", blood-ties, race, and nation are naturalized.[10] The white heterosexual family ideal is upheld by segregation, discrimination, racialized nationalism and anti-immigration policies. This implies that feminists should remain sceptical towards the Swedish ideal associated with the construction of the gender equal family, since it builds upon and reproduces the social, discursive and geographical relegation of the "Others", often acted out as racialized integration through subordinating practices.
White mourning and melancholia
The normalized and naturalized hierarchies surrounding Swedishness and the double-binding power of Swedish whiteness through the mourning of the loss of "old Sweden" and "good Sweden" may explain the hysterical post-election anger among "progressives" about the "reactionaries'" electoral success. During the election campaign, the Sweden Democrats rallied under the slogan Ge oss Sverige tillbaka ("Give us Sweden back"), a slogan that appealed to both sides. It may also explain why the antiracist movement in Sweden and Scandinavia is so heavily dominated by white Swedes, in contrast to North America and the UK, where the antiracist movement is to a large degree composed of representatives of the minorities themselves. It may also explain why white Swedish feminists who identify with what has been called hegemonic feminism sometimes ally themselves with racist ideologies.[11]

The Sweden Democrats' longing for "old Sweden" is expressed as a wish to return to a time when there were no ethno-racial conflicts and no non-western "patriarchal excesses". For white antiracists, on the other hand, what is under threat is the image of Sweden as an antiracist and feminist country. Ultimately, these self-images are felt to be threatened by the presence of non-western migrants.

The fact of having held the title of the world's most progressive and left-liberal country, combined with Sweden's perception of itself as the most racially homogenous and pure of all white nations, forms a double bind that makes it almost impossible to transform Swedishness into something that will also accept people of colour. When the object of love – i.e. antiracist Sweden and ethnically homogenous Sweden – is besieged or threatened with distnction, there is nothing left but an unspeakable melancholia filled with limitless pain.

The notion of "lost Sweden" also excludes people who did not live in the country during the period being mourned, or people without biological ties to the "founders" of the ethos of solidarity. Thus, directly and indirectly, the image of left-liberal, antiracist and egalitarian Sweden is constructed around the image of a past in which diversity did not exist. In other words, the recent election took place at a time when Sweden is wracked by white mourning and melancholia. Nostalgia for a white past constructed around the welfare state and the longing for a homogenous future in which hybridity has been erased is the common feature of white melancholia, which has also made itself heard in the debate following the Utøya massacre in Norway.

White melancholia, so painful to bear yet unspeakable, is a psychic state, a structure of connection to the nation, common to Swedes as well as to the image of Sweden in the world. It is as much about the humiliating decline of Sweden as frontrunner of egalitarianism, humanitarianism and antiracism as about the mourning of the passing of the Swedish population as the whitest of all white peoples.

Any future attempt to disentangle Swedishness and whiteness will have to be able to deconstruct a Swedishness that bars non-whites and traps white Swedes through the double-edged images of "old Sweden" and "good Sweden". The hope is that a transformative moment will come about that allows the mourning for "old Sweden" and "good Sweden" to project itself towards a more constructive understanding of Swedishness.

However in order to be able to accomplish this transformation, it is necessary to acknowledge the fact that the object of love is irretrievably and irrevocably lost, how painful that may be.


Text by Tobias Hübinette, Catrin Lundström

[1] Tobias Hübinette and Carina Tigervall, "To Be Non-White in a Colour-Blind Society: Conversations with Adoptees and Adoptive Parents in Sweden on Everyday Racism", Journal of Intercultural Studies 30 (2009); Catrin Lundström, "'Concrete Bodies': Young Latina Women Transgressing the Boundaries of Race and Class in White Inner-City Stockholm", Gender, Place and Culture 17 (2010); Lena Sawyer, "Routings: Race, African Diasporas, and Swedish Belonging", Transforming Anthropology 11 (2002).
[2] Maja Hagerman, Det rena landet. Om konsten att uppfinna sina förfäder [The Pure Country. On the Art of Inventing Ancestors] (Stockholm: Prisma, 2006); Katarina Schough, Hyberboré. Föreställningen om Sveriges plats i världen [Hyperbole. The Image of Sweden's Place in the World] (Stockholm: Carlsson, 2008).
[3] Gunnar Broberg, Statlig rasforskning. En historik över Rasbiologiska institutet [State-Run Race Science. A History of the Institute for Race Biology] (Stockholm: Natur & kultur, 1995).
[4] Mattias Tydén, Från politik till praktik. De svenska steriliseringslagarna 1935-1975 [From Policy to Practice. The Swedish Sterilization Laws 1935-1975] (Stockholm: Fritzes, 2000).
[5] Matthew W. Hughey, "The (Dis)similarities of White Racial Identities: The Conceptual Framework of 'Hegemonic Whiteness'", Ethnic and Racial Studies 33 (2010).
[6] France Winddance Twine and Charles Gallagher, "The Future of Whiteness: A Map of the 'Third Wave'", Ethnic and Racial Studies 31 (2009); Jonathan Warren and France Winddance Twine, "White Americans, the New Minority? Non-Blacks and the Ever-Expanding Boundaries of Whiteness", Journal of Black Studies 28 (1997).
[7] David R. Roediger, The Wages of Whiteness: Race and the Making of the American Working Class (London: Verso, 1991).
[8] Suvi Keskinen, Salla Tuori, Sari Irni, and Diana Mulinari, eds., Complying with Colonialism. Gender, Race and Ethnicity in the Nordic Region (Farnham: Ashgate, 2009); Paulina de los Reyes and Diana Mulinari, Intersektionalitet. Kritiska reflektioner över (o)jämlikhetens landskap [Intersectionality. Critical Reflections on the Landscape of (In)equality] (Malmö: Liber, 2005).
[9] Sarah Ahmed, Strange Encounters: Embodied Others in Post-Coloniality (London: Routledge, 2004).
[10] Patricia Hill Collins, "It's All in the Family: Intersections of Gender, Race, and Nation", Hypatia 13 (1998).
[11] Mia Liinasson, "Institutionalized Knowledge: Notes on the Processes of Inclusion and Exclusion in Gender Studies in Sweden", NORA – Nordic Journal of Feminist and Gender Research 18 (2010); de los Reyes and Mulinari, Intersektionalitet. Kritiska reflektioner över (o)jämlikhetens landskap [Intersectionality. Critical Reflections on the Landscape of (In)equality].

Source:www.eurozine.com

Nothing biblical in factory farming

Something has gone badly wrong in relations between human beings and other animals, and it is not just animal welfare and animal rights organisations that say so. Large swathes of the public are troubled too.

Even people who take their lead from Genesis, from its assurance that God has granted us dominion over the beasts in order to feed ourselves, suffer nagging doubts whether factory farming and a food industry operating on an industrial scale to turn living animals into what are euphemistically called ''animal products'', are quite what God had in mind.



So it is not unreasonable that animal rights organisations are increasingly seeking to give voice to the (by definition) voiceless victims of the food industry, targeting factory farming, while not ignoring other practices - the use of animals in laboratory experiments, for example, or the trade in wild animals, or the fur trade - that might equally be condemned as cruel and inhuman.

The transformation of animals into production units dates back to the late 19th century.

Since that time we have already had one warning, loud and clear, that there is something deeply, even cosmically wrong, about using industrial methods to kill fellow creatures on an industrial scale.

In the middle of the 20th century a group of Germans had the idea of adapting the methods of the industrial stockyard, as pioneered and perfected in Chicago, to the slaughter - or what they preferred to call the processing - of human beings.

When, belatedly, we found out what the Nazis had been up to, we cried out in horror. ''What a terrible crime, to treat human beings like cattle.'' we cried out. ''If we had only known beforehand.''

But our cry should more accurately have been: ''What a terrible crime, to treat living human beings like units in an industrial process.''

And our cry might have had a postscript: ''What a terrible crime, come to think of it, to treat any living being like a unit in an industrial process.''

Animal protection groups work for the amelioration of the conditions under which animals spend their lives. In a longer time frame, some work towards the elimination of factory farming.

In the case of Voiceless, the animal protection group founded by the Sherman family in 2004, this is done not by direct action but by persuasion. Its persuasive efforts are directed at the vast majority of the public who know and don't know that there is something bad going on, something that stinks to high heaven. It offers such people practical options for what to do next after they have been revolted by a glimpse of the lives factory animals live and the deaths they die.

Factory farming is a new phenomenon, very new indeed in the history of animal husbandry. The good news is that, after decades of untrammelled expansion, the industry has been forced on to the defensive. The activities of organisations such as Voiceless have shifted the onus on to the industry to justify its practices; and because its practices are indefensible and unjustifiable except on narrow economic grounds, the industry is battening down its hatches and hoping the storm will blow itself out. Thus, in so far as there was a public relations war, the industry has already lost the war.

The task of animal rights organisations is to show ordinary people that there are alternatives to the animal-products industry, that these alternatives need not involve sacrifices in health and nutrition, that there is no reason why these alternatives need be costly, and furthermore that the sacrifices they are being called on to make are not really sacrifices at all - that the only sacrifices in the whole scenario are being made by non-human animals.

In this regard, children provide the brightest hope. Given half a chance, children see through the lies with which advertisers bombard them (the happy chooks that are magically transformed into succulent nuggets). It takes but one glance into a slaughterhouse to turn a child into a lifelong vegetarian.

Text by J. M. Coetzee, The Sydney Morning Herland, 5 dec.2011
Source:www.smh.com.au

The 2003 Nobel Laureate for Literature J. M. Coetzee is patron of Voiceless and chairman of the judging panel of the Voiceless Writing Prize sponsored by Australian Ethical Investment. The Herald is media partner of the prize, which seeks to advance public understanding of the relationship between humans and animals.
voiceless.org.au

Christ is taught how to pray

It is an iconography from Jonkoping, that represents the young Christ being taught how to pray by the holy Virgin sitting on a low bench. It is not necessary to be an architect in order to imagine that the depicted place is the interior of a palace and the bench is the kind of furniture used in the Classical Rome.The child Jesus is guided by his mother and it is surprising that even the discipline of Christianity is preceded by its own leader .

Broadsheet,Jonkoping, Sweden, 1837.

Banana House

Terunobu Fujimori
Banana House Sketch,2010

Is Modern Capitalism Sustainable?

I am often asked if the recent global financial crisis marks the beginning of the end of modern capitalism. It is a curious question, because it seems to presume that there is a viable replacement waiting in the wings. The truth of the matter is that, for now at least, the only serious alternatives to today’s dominant Anglo-American paradigm are other forms of capitalism.
Continental European capitalism, which combines generous health and social benefits with reasonable working hours, long vacation periods, early retirement, and relatively equal income distributions, would seem to have everything to recommend it – except sustainability. China’s Darwinian capitalism, with its fierce competition among export firms, a weak social-safety net, and widespread government intervention, is widely touted as the inevitable heir to Western capitalism, if only because of China’s huge size and consistent outsize growth rate. Yet China’s economic system is continually evolving.
Indeed, it is far from clear how far China’s political, economic, and financial structures will continue to transform themselves, and whether China will eventually morph into capitalism’s new exemplar. In any case, China is still encumbered by the usual social, economic, and financial vulnerabilities of a rapidly growing lower-income country.
Perhaps the real point is that, in the broad sweep of history, all current forms of capitalism are ultimately transitional. Modern-day capitalism has had an extraordinary run since the start of the Industrial Revolution two centuries ago, lifting billions of ordinary people out of abject poverty. Marxism and heavy-handed socialism have disastrous records by comparison. But, as industrialization and technological progress spread to Asia (and now to Africa), someday the struggle for subsistence will no longer be a primary imperative, and contemporary capitalism’s numerous flaws may loom larger.
First, even the leading capitalist economies have failed to price public goods such as clean air and water effectively. The failure of efforts to conclude a new global climate-change agreement is symptomatic of the paralysis.
Second, along with great wealth, capitalism has produced extraordinary levels of inequality. The growing gap is partly a simple byproduct of innovation and entrepreneurship. People do not complain about Steve Jobs’s success; his contributions are obvious. But this is not always the case: great wealth enables groups and individuals to buy political power and influence, which in turn helps to generate even more wealth. Only a few countries – Sweden, for example – have been able to curtail this vicious circle without causing growth to collapse.
A third problem is the provision and distribution of medical care, a market that fails to satisfy several of the basic requirements necessary for the price mechanism to produce economic efficiency, beginning with the difficulty that consumers have in assessing the quality of their treatment.
The problem will only get worse: health-care costs as a proportion of income are sure to rise as societies get richer and older, possibly exceeding 30% of GDP within a few decades. In health care, perhaps more than in any other market, many countries are struggling with the moral dilemma of how to maintain incentives to produce and consume efficiently without producing unacceptably large disparities in access to care.
It is ironic that modern capitalist societies engage in public campaigns to urge individuals to be more attentive to their health, while fostering an economic ecosystem that seduces many consumers into an extremely unhealthy diet. According to the United States Centers for Disease Control, 34% of Americans are obese. Clearly, conventionally measured economic growth – which implies higher consumption – cannot be an end in itself.
Fourth, today’s capitalist systems vastly undervalue the welfare of unborn generations. For most of the era since the Industrial Revolution, this has not mattered, as the continuing boon of technological advance has trumped short-sighted policies. By and large, each generation has found itself significantly better off than the last. But, with the world’s population surging above seven billion, and harbingers of resource constraints becoming ever more apparent, there is no guarantee that this trajectory can be maintained.
Financial crises are of course a fifth problem, perhaps the one that has provoked the most soul-searching of late. In the world of finance, continual technological innovation has not conspicuously reduced risks, and might well have magnified them.
In principle, none of capitalism’s problems is insurmountable, and economists have offered a variety of market-based solutions. A high global price for carbon would induce firms and individuals to internalize the cost of their polluting activities. Tax systems can be designed to provide a greater measure of redistribution of income without necessarily involving crippling distortions, by minimizing non-transparent tax expenditures and keeping marginal rates low. Effective pricing of health care, including the pricing of waiting times, could encourage a better balance between equality and efficiency. Financial systems could be better regulated, with stricter attention to excessive accumulations of debt.
Will capitalism be a victim of its own success in producing massive wealth? For now, as fashionable as the topic of capitalism’s demise might be, the possibility seems remote. Nevertheless, as pollution, financial instability, health problems, and inequality continue to grow, and as political systems remain paralyzed, capitalism’s future might not seem so secure in a few decades as it seems now.

Text by Kenneth Rogoff, 2011
Source : www.project-syndicate.org

Experiment in Faces

One of a number of sculptures executed upon concrete blocks which were the structure of his Arizona home, dismantled by the estate after the death of Max Ernst. The decision was made to only restore the front artistic surface rather than the whole.

Source : www.art-conservation.org

The Colors needed Counseling

Picture by Grant Snider,2011
Source:thoughtballoonhelium.blogspot.com/

The Education of a Libertarian

I remain committed to the faith of my teenage years: to authentic human freedom as a precondition for the highest good. I stand against confiscatory taxes, totalitarian collectives, and the ideology of the inevitability of the death of every individual. For all these reasons, I still call myself “libertarian.”

But I must confess that over the last two decades, I have changed radically on the question of how to achieve these goals. Most importantly, I no longer believe that freedom and democracy are compatible. By tracing out the development of my thinking, I hope to frame some of the challenges faced by all classical liberals today.

As a Stanford undergraduate studying philosophy in the late 1980s, I naturally was drawn to the give-and-take of debate and the desire to bring about freedom through political means. I started a student newspaper to challenge the prevailing campus orthodoxies; we scored some limited victories, most notably in undoing speech codes instituted by the university. But in a broader sense we did not achieve all that much for all the effort expended. Much of it felt like trench warfare on the Western Front in World War I; there was a lot of carnage, but we did not move the center of the debate. In hindsight, we were preaching mainly to the choir — even if this had the important side benefit of convincing the choir’s members to continue singing for the rest of their lives.

As a young lawyer and trader in Manhattan in the 1990s, I began to understand why so many become disillusioned after college. The world appears too big a place. Rather than fight the relentless indifference of the universe, many of my saner peers retreated to tending their small gardens. The higher one’s IQ, the more pessimistic one became about free-market politics — capitalism simply is not that popular with the crowd. Among the smartest conservatives, this pessimism often manifested in heroic drinking; the smartest libertarians, by contrast, had fewer hang-ups about positive law and escaped not only to alcohol but beyond it.

As one fast-forwards to 2009, the prospects for a libertarian politics appear grim indeed. Exhibit A is a financial crisis caused by too much debt and leverage, facilitated by a government that insured against all sorts of moral hazards — and we know that the response to this crisis involves way more debt and leverage, and way more government. Those who have argued for free markets have been screaming into a hurricane. The events of recent months shatter any remaining hopes of politically minded libertarians. For those of us who are libertarian in 2009, our education culminates with the knowledge that the broader education of the body politic has become a fool’s errand.

Indeed, even more pessimistically, the trend has been going the wrong way for a long time. To return to finance, the last economic depression in the United States that did not result in massive government intervention was the collapse of 1920–21. It was sharp but short, and entailed the sort of Schumpeterian “creative destruction” that could lead to a real boom. The decade that followed — the roaring 1920s — was so strong that historians have forgotten the depression that started it. The 1920s were the last decade in American history during which one could be genuinely optimistic about politics. Since 1920, the vast increase in welfare beneficiaries and the extension of the franchise to women — two constituencies that are notoriously tough for libertarians — have rendered the notion of “capitalist democracy” into an oxymoron.

In the face of these realities, one would despair if one limited one’s horizon to the world of politics. I do not despair because I no longer believe that politics encompasses all possible futures of our world. In our time, the great task for libertarians is to find an escape from politics in all its forms — from the totalitarian and fundamentalist catastrophes to the unthinking demos that guides so-called “social democracy.”

The critical question then becomes one of means, of how to escape not via politics but beyond it. Because there are no truly free places left in our world, I suspect that the mode for escape must involve some sort of new and hitherto untried process that leads us to some undiscovered country; and for this reason I have focused my efforts on new technologies that may create a new space for freedom. Let me briefly speak to three such technological frontiers:

(1) Cyberspace. As an entrepreneur and investor, I have focused my efforts on the Internet. In the late 1990s, the founding vision of PayPal centered on the creation of a new world currency, free from all government control and dilution — the end of monetary sovereignty, as it were. In the 2000s, companies like Facebook create the space for new modes of dissent and new ways to form communities not bounded by historical nation-states. By starting a new Internet business, an entrepreneur may create a new world. The hope of the Internet is that these new worlds will impact and force change on the existing social and political order. The limitation of the Internet is that these new worlds are virtual and that any escape may be more imaginary than real. The open question, which will not be resolved for many years, centers on which of these accounts of the Internet proves true.

(2) Outer space. Because the vast reaches of outer space represent a limitless frontier, they also represent a limitless possibility for escape from world politics. But the final frontier still has a barrier to entry: Rocket technologies have seen only modest advances since the 1960s, so that outer space still remains almost impossibly far away. We must redouble the efforts to commercialize space, but we also must be realistic about the time horizons involved. The libertarian future of classic science fiction, à la Heinlein, will not happen before the second half of the 21st century.

(3) Seasteading. Between cyberspace and outer space lies the possibility of settling the oceans. To my mind, the questions about whether people will live there (answer: enough will) are secondary to the questions about whether seasteading technology is imminent. From my vantage point, the technology involved is more tentative than the Internet, but much more realistic than space travel. We may have reached the stage at which it is economically feasible, or where it soon will be feasible. It is a realistic risk, and for this reason I eagerly support this initiative.

The future of technology is not pre-determined, and we must resist the temptation of technological utopianism — the notion that technology has a momentum or will of its own, that it will guarantee a more free future, and therefore that we can ignore the terrible arc of the political in our world.

A better metaphor is that we are in a deadly race between politics and technology. The future will be much better or much worse, but the question of the future remains very open indeed. We do not know exactly how close this race is, but I suspect that it may be very close, even down to the wire. Unlike the world of politics, in the world of technology the choices of individuals may still be paramount. The fate of our world may depend on the effort of a single person who builds or propagates the machinery of freedom that makes the world safe for capitalism.

For this reason, all of us must wish Patri Friedman the very best in his extraordinary experiment.

Text by Peter Thiel
April 13th, 2009.
Source : www.cato-unbound.org

Carpenter Dreams the Countryside

Carpenter Dreams the Countryside, 2011
Wood, plywood, Acrylic.

Honduras shrugged

Two start-ups want to try out libertarian ideas in the country’s new special development regions

DISGUSTED by an increasingly invasive state, America’s most capable entrepreneurs retreat to Galt’s Gulch, a libertarian commune. That was the theme of Ayn Rand’s magnum opus, “Atlas Shrugged”, a sacred text for libertarians ever since it was published in 1957. Actually creating such an enclave has been the dream of many fans of small government (or of none at all). Several have had a try at it, but their efforts have always ended in disaster .

Now, for the first time, libertarians have a real chance to implement their ideas. In addition to a big special development region, the Honduran government intends to approve two smaller zones. And two libertarian-leaning start-ups have already signed a preliminary memorandum of understanding with the Honduran government to develop them.

One firm goes by the name of Future Cities Development Corporation. It was co-founded by Patri Friedman, a grandson of Milton Friedman, a Nobel laureate in economics, and until recently executive director of the Seasteading Institute, a group producing research on how to build ocean-based communes. The other is called Grupo Ciudades Libres (Free Cities Group) and is the brainchild of Michael Strong and Kevin Lyons, two entrepreneurs and libertarian activists.

Both share a purpose: to build “free cities”. Last April all three spoke at a conference organised by Universidad Francisco Marroquín, a libertarian outfit in Guatemala. In September they and Giancarlo Ibárgüen, the university’s president, launched the Free Cities Institute, a think-tank, to foster the cause.

As so often with enthusiasts, divisions within the cause run deep. The two firms hail from different parts of the libertarian spectrum. Mr Friedman is an outspoken critic of democracy. It is “ill-suited for a libertarian state”, he wrote in an essay in 2009—because it is “rigged against libertarians” (they would always lose) and inefficient. Rather than giving its citizens a voice, he argues, they should be free to exit; cities should compete for them by offering the best services.

The second firm’s backers appear to be less radical. A founder of several charter schools, Mr Strong is now the force behind FLOW, a movement that claims to combine libertarian thinking “with love, compassion, social and environmental consciousness”, says its website. He too prefers exit over voice (meaning that he thinks that leaving and joining are better constraints on executive power than the ballot box). But he also believes that democratic consent is needed in certain areas, such as criminal justice. His goal in Honduras is less to implement libertarian ideals than to reduce poverty and to speed up economic development.

Some in the Honduran government have libertarian leanings, which is one reason why the authorities have moved so quickly. But when the master developers for the new zones are selected next year, strong political credentials will not be enough—and may even prove to be a drawback. Mr Friedman is stressing a difference between his political beliefs and his firm. “Ideology makes bad business,” he says, adding that Future Cities Development wants to focus on the needs of the people who live in the city.

Yet the biggest hurdle for the libertarian start-ups may be that the transparency commission, which will oversee the development regions, is unlikely to give them free rein. The “constitutional statute” for the development zones, which the Honduran national congress passed in August, does not leave much wiggle room in key areas, not least when it comes to democracy: ultimately their citizens will vote.

Both firms, however, have links to prominent libertarians with deep pockets. Mr Strong is close to John Mackey, the co-founder and chief executive of Whole Foods, a high-end supermarket chain—though Mr Strong says that Mr Mackey already has too many other things on his plate. Mr Friedman’s contacts seem more promising: the Seasteading Institute received lots of cash from Peter Thiel, a Silicon Valley billionaire who founded the internet payment service PayPal and was an early investor in Facebook, the world’s biggest social network.

Mr Thiel’s ambitions go far beyond scouting out the next big thing in technology. “I no longer believe that freedom and democracy are compatible,” he wrote in an essay in 2009. This is why libertarians should find an escape from politics, he added. “Because there are no truly free places left in our world, I suspect that the mode of escape must involve some sort of new and hitherto untried process that leads us to some undiscovered country.” Back then he had the ocean or space in mind. Honduras would certainly be more convenient.

Source : economist.com, 10 Dec, 2011